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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001774

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TAGS: PREL PGOV KK GG BK FUN
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND ROBERT COOPER DISCUSS KOSOVO,
GEORGIA, BOSINA

Classified By: USEU POL M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 b. and d.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In successive meetings at the European Union on November 20, EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and Ambassador Kristen Silverberg obtained consent from the French Presidency and Robert Cooper of the EU Council Secretariat that the UNSYG Statement on Kosovo should include both the six-point plan agreed to by Serbia and Kosovo's four-point statement, so as to allow unobstructed deployment of EULEX in Kosovo. On Georgia, A/S Fried gave an cautiously positive assessment of the businesslike talks held in Geneva the day before. On Bosnia, Fried and Cooper shared their pessimism about the quality of leadership there. Nonetheless, Cooper was hopeful for tangible movement on the Peace Implementation Council's 5-plus-2 goals and conditions within the next three months to allow for a review of the OHR and EUFOR profiles. END SUMMARY.

KOSOVO: TOWARD EULEX DEPLOYMENT

¶2. (C) A/S Dan Fried and Robert Cooper began by discussing how best to obtain Kosovar and Serbian acquiescence to EULEX deployment, given word that the UN Secretary General's report on Kosovo was again being edited by David Harland. A/S Fried related how -- in a fortuitous discussion just minutes before with French MFA counselor Eric Chevalier, ICR Peter Feith, and Solana Deputy Cabinet Director Patrice Bergamini -- Feith had proposed two annexes to the UNSYG report, one the Serbian six-point plan and the other the Kosovar four-point statement. Cooper thought this "a clever piece of bureaucracy," though he did not think it mattered whether the two were appended to, or integrated within, the report. Cooper added that HR Solana would call Tadic later that same day to say there was a deal. Haste was important, said Cooper, since the relevant Security Council meeting would be on November 26.

¶3. (C) Ambassador Silverberg, who had been on the phone with USUN Amb. De Carlo and in a follow-up discussion with Eric Chevalier, reported that Chevalier had reached UN DPKO Alain LeRoy, convincing him to re-take control of the UNSYG report. LeRoy reportedly stated he wanted to integrate the six-point plan and four-point statement into the text of the report, rather than append them. Amb. Silverberg cautioned that a contemplated PRST should be considered optional, since insisting on a PRST could provide an opening for Russia to balk, despite assurances from Serbia that Russia would follow. A/S Fried said it was important for the Serbs and Kosovars to hear from the EU directly its determination to deploy EULEX on time, and Cooper assured him that has been the EU message. Chevalier had said in the earlier meeting with A/S Dan Fried that FonMin Kouchner would call Tadic to reinforce that message.

GEORGIA: POSITIVE GENEVA TALKS

¶4. (C) Robert Cooper asked about the November 19 meeting in Geneva, and A/S Fried responded that the results exceeded his expectations. Aided by Pierre Morel's thorough diplomacy, he said, the atmosphere was businesslike. Fried said his message

to the Georgians is that they be realistic about the prospects against an early recovery of the breakaway provinces. Cooper encouraged that message, observing that every time the Georgians resort to force, "they lose ground." A/S Fried added that the Georgians said they would not object to Americans going eventually to Tskhinvali, provided they were given advance notice.

15. (C) A/S Dan Fried and Robert Cooper both wondered if the Russian MFA would assert itself more on the Georgia portfolio, heretofore controlled by the Putin-military-security apparatus. Fried noted that Deputy FM Karasin was evidently operating in Geneva on limited instructions, since he stopped the IDP working group from progressing farther than it did. Still, Dan Fried gave Karasin credit for the South Ossetians' relatively good behavior. Cooper said it was important to continue working, particularly on a mechanism for dispute settlements, before the next Geneva session on December 18. A/S Fried said UN envoy Verbeke would have the pen on that item.

BOSNIA: DOUBTS ABOUT LEADERSHIP

16. (C) Robert Cooper said he had never seen the Bosnians so quarrelsome and so "absolutely useless." A/S Fried characterized his meeting earlier the same day with BiH President Haris Silajdzic as surreal, saying that Silajdzic's talk of "Hitler" (a reference to the Republika Srpska), "ghettos" (a reference to the conditions of the Bosniaks today), and turning Bosnia into a mini-Iran was inflammatory nonsense. Fried said it is evident that Silajdzic's plan is to make things worse in hopes of some kind of general

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reassessment ("the worst, the better"). Cooper said Silajdzic was marginalizing himself. On his meeting with Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik, Dan Fried said he told him talk of secession was unacceptable. His joint meeting with Bosnian Deputy Speaker Sulejman Tihic and HDZ Party President Dragan Covic, Fried said, was more encouraging, and that his message to them was that the radical tide would pass and their time would come; Europe awaits. (See septel on meetings with Bosnians.)

17. (C) On next steps, Cooper said that there would be transition regarding OHR and EUFOR, and he hoped for some kind of tangible progress on 5-plus-2 in the next three months (Comment: before the next PIC meeting). Brcko, he said, was key.

18. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried cleared this cable.
SILVERBERG

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